The European Central Bank published research in its Macroprudential Bulletin examining how wider adoption of euro-denominated stablecoins could affect euro area sovereign bond markets. The article develops an estimated “pass-through rate” linking growth in stablecoin issuance to associated sovereign bond exposures, and shows that the market impact depends on whether stablecoins are issued by banks or electronic money institutions, how reserves are invested, and how issuers and recipient banks manage liquidity metrics. It also argues that the net effect on sovereign bond demand hinges on which sectors fund stablecoin purchases, and that larger stablecoins could deepen interlinkages between crypto markets and traditional finance in stress episodes. The analysis focuses on single-currency euro stablecoins classified as e-money tokens under the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, which for electronic money institutions requires at least 30% of reserves to be held as deposits with credit institutions, rising to 60% for significant issuers, with the remainder in low-risk highly liquid instruments such as sovereign bonds. As of January 2026, euro-denominated stablecoins had a market capitalisation of around EUR 450 million, up from EUR 50 million at the beginning of 2024. Using illustrative balance sheet scenarios and Liquidity Coverage Ratio data from the first quarter of 2025, the ECB estimates pass-through rates ranging from 0.31 to 1.26 depending on issuer type and liquidity preferences, with an estimated 0.87 pass-through for the three largest euro stablecoins. When extending the framework to net sovereign bond demand across use cases, the estimated pass-through can be materially smaller and can turn negative in some wholesale funding scenarios, reflecting offsetting sales of sovereign bonds by banks facing deposit outflows. On contagion, the article highlights that large redemptions could force reserve-asset sales, while noting that the deposit requirement for electronic money institution issuers can delay sovereign bond sales but may also transmit run dynamics to the banking sector; it cites draft standards proposing deposit concentration limits, a 1.5% cap on a bank’s exposure to any single stablecoin, and a 35% cap on reserve allocation to a single sovereign issuer.