The Financial Stability Board has published an assessment of cross-border vulnerabilities and financial stability monitoring for global stablecoin arrangements, building on its 2023 recommendations and 2025 implementation review. It finds that uncertain interaction among national regulatory frameworks can complicate oversight, crisis management and insolvency, while creating scope for regulatory arbitrage. Stablecoins had a total market value of about USD 300 billion as of mid-2026, with 99% by value pegged to the U.S. dollar. Round-the-clock secondary-market trading and internationally mobile, partly unobservable liabilities could accelerate runs when redemption capacity is constrained. Stress could spread to traditional finance through reserve-asset fire sales, bank deposit withdrawals, payment and settlement dependencies, and foreign exchange markets. Multi-issuer arrangements face additional risks because redemption demand may concentrate at one entity while reserves are held separately across jurisdictions, making effective rebalancing dependent on market access, reserve mobility, information sharing and coordination. Monitoring is constrained by pseudonymous blockchain activity, limited geographic and use attribution, undisclosed information, and reliance on private data compilers using inconsistent or proprietary methods. The FSB suggests developing common financial stability metrics, including measures of secondary-market liquidity and the geographic distribution of holdings, redemptions and reserves. It also identifies priorities to strengthen cross-border information sharing, support implementation of the 2023 recommendations, improve data quality and comparability, and gather information on planning for the distress or failure of global stablecoin arrangements.
Financial Stability Board identifies cross-border stablecoin vulnerabilities and data gaps, outlines monitoring priorities
The Financial Stability Board has identified cross-border regulatory, liquidity, operational and insolvency vulnerabilities in global stablecoin arrangements. Monitoring remains limited by pseudonymous activity, weak geographic attribution and inconsistent private data sources. The FSB outlined priorities for common metrics, stronger information sharing and cooperation, and planning for stablecoin distress or failure.