Synthesis
The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the Board of IOSCO are consulting on a voluntary, non-binding cyber resilience toolkit intended to provide financial market infrastructures with practical, technology-neutral support for strengthening their cyber resilience frameworks and implementing operational resilience-related components of the Principles for financial market infrastructures, as informed by the 2016 CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures. The toolkit is organized around four areas: (1) governance of cyber risk and resilience, including board and senior management capabilities, ecosystem risk management, maturity models and resilience metrics; (2) identification and design of extreme but plausible cyber scenarios, including scenario scope, threat intelligence, emerging risks and ecosystem dependencies; (3) response, resumption and recovery planning, covering critical operations and information assets, infrastructure and data resilience, third-party dependencies, contingency arrangements, safe resumption and the disconnection and reconnection of ecosystem entities; and (4) cyber resilience testing and exercising.
Purpose & rationale
Cyber risks to FMIs are intensifying, while AI is increasing the speed and sophistication of attacks. CPMI-IOSCO’s 2022 implementation assessment identified scope to improve cyber response and recovery plans and resilience planning and testing. Although the PFMI and Cyber Guidance remain fit for purpose, these findings and the evolving threat environment indicate a need for practical, adaptable implementation support. FMIs’ interconnectedness also requires measures addressing contagion and coordinated recovery across their ecosystems.
Key issues for discussion
The toolkit comprises four complementary tools with practical considerations for each. The considerations are voluntary options, to be selected according to an FMI’s needs rather than applied as an exhaustive checklist.
| Dimension | Practical considerations |
|---|---|
| Tool 1: Governance of cyber resilience at FMIs | |
Board capabilities |
|
Ecosystem oversight |
|
Benchmarking and metrics |
|
| Tool 2: Extreme but plausible cyber scenario identification and design | |
Scenario development process |
|
Realism and complexity |
|
Validation and updating |
|
| Tool 3: Developing response, resumption and recovery plans | |
Critical operations, assets and dependencies |
|
Resilience and recovery capabilities |
|
Contingency and safe resumption |
|
Disconnection and reconnection |
|
| Tool 4: Cyber resilience testing and exercising | |
Testing program design and coverage |
|
System changes and advanced testing |
|
Learning, remediation and continuous improvement |
|