Overview
Recent policy proposals and discussion around tokenization address several core questions. Among those, are six connected questions: how tokenised instruments should be characterised within the regulatory perimeter; when on-chain records create, evidence or transfer legal rights; who remains accountable when regulated functions are automated, compressed or redistributed across tokenised arrangements; how infrastructure, interoperability and standards can support scale without creating fragmented markets; how access, identity, investor eligibility and financial-integrity controls should operate across wallets, ledgers and intermediaries; and what form of money should be used to settle tokenised transactions while preserving finality, par value and the singleness of money.
Across these areas, the common policy direction is that tokenisation is generally treated as a change in representation, recordkeeping or market infrastructure rather than an automatic change in the underlying legal or economic nature of the asset. The focus is therefore on how existing financial-market, funds, prudential, custody, settlement, conduct and financial-crime frameworks apply when assets, money and records are represented on programmable ledgers, and where targeted legal clarification, supervisory expectations or rule adjustments may be needed to preserve legal certainty, identifiable accountability, resilient infrastructure, effective investor protection and comparable regulatory outcomes.
What's new
The European Fund and Asset Management Association has published a PwC report recommending targeted EU regulatory changes for tokenised money market funds, while finding that existing fund rules already accommodate these structures. Priorities include clarifying collateral eligibility and legal control so fund units can be transferred directly for margin purposes rather than first redeemed into cash. The report also recommends harmonised permission for regulated funds to use stablecoins and supports the proposed settlement finality framework explicitly accommodating distributed ledger technology.
The Dubai Financial Services Authority has published a white paper identifying regulated custody, trusted digital cash and interoperable infrastructure as conditions for broader adoption of tokenisation. Greater consistency in standards across jurisdictions could reduce fragmentation and support market participation. Financial stability risks appear limited at the current scale but could grow as tokenised markets expand and become more connected with traditional finance.
The Dubai Financial Services Authority has released a white paper drawing on practitioners’ views on the transition from tokenisation experiments to practical applications in financial services. It examines how custody, digital settlement, interoperability and coordination across borders could support markets at scale, without prescribing a specific technological, regulatory or commercial outcome.
Deep dive
What is being regulated: the underlying asset, the token, the legal claim represented by the token, or the activity performed around it?
Authorities generally treat tokenisation, in itself, as a change in the representation and recordkeeping of an asset rather than in its legal or economic nature. A token is therefore regulated according to the claim it represents and the activities performed around it, not solely according to the technology on which it is recorded.
The starting point is to establish what the holder of a token actually acquires. Where the issuer itself issues the security in tokenised form, whether natively on the ledger or as a digital representation of a security held in its conventional register, the token may constitute the security itself or serve as a mechanism for recording or transferring ownership of it. Where a third party creates a token backed by securities it holds in custody, or a token that merely provides synthetic exposure to a security, the holder may acquire a direct or indirect interest in the securities or a separate claim on that third party, depending on the legal arrangement, and may not receive all the rights attached to the security. Where a token represents a share in an asset or a pool of assets, as with tokenised fund units and fractional ownership structures, the question is what ownership rights it confers and whether the arrangement amounts to a regulated investment product, including a collective investment scheme.
Once the claim is established, the prevailing approach is to apply the existing regime for that claim, which may mean, for example, that a tokenised security is regulated under securities law and a tokenised fund unit under the rules for funds. Existing regimes, however, do not always map cleanly onto tokenised arrangements, and adjustments are being made in certain situations. The first is overlap, such as where a tokenised asset or activity falls under several regimes at once. The Bermuda Monetary Authority, for example, has consulted on a single definition of tokenised investments across its investment business, investment funds, fund administration and digital asset legislation, together with proposed exemptions that would allow eligible firms licensed under one regime to carry out specified tokenised-investment activities without a second licence. The second is incomplete coverage, where existing categories do not fully capture tokenised arrangements. Australia’s digital asset framework, which takes effect in April 2027, addresses this by defining tokenised custody platforms—arrangements that record assets held for clients as digital tokens—as a new financial product and bringing their operators within financial services licensing.
When does an on-chain event create, evidence, transfer or extinguish legal rights, and when is that transfer final and enforceable?
A recurring position is that scalable tokenisation depends on legal certainty over the authoritative record of ownership, the legal effect of token transfer and the point at which settlement becomes final. Tokenisation may automate transfer and settlement, but it does not remove the need to determine whether the on-chain record is legally operative, merely evidential, or an instruction to update an off-chain register. Smart-contract enforceability, liability for code errors, recourse, governing law and cross-border recognition remain core legal questions.
The practical considerations focus on identifying the legally authoritative record, whether that is an on-chain register, off-chain register, hybrid record, CSD / DSD record, or fund register maintained using DLT. Examples distinguish models where on-chain transfer updates the issuer’s master ownership record from models where token transfer only notifies an off-chain recordkeeper; fund-tokenisation guidance also recognises that an on-chain record may serve as primary books and records where resilience requirements are met. Settlement finality is treated both as a legal question and, for regulated settlement systems, as a need for a deterministic and auditable point of transaction commitment. Legal assessments commonly cover enforceability of tokenholder rights, smart contracts, cross-border recognition, correction powers, court orders, insolvency procedures and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Who is accountable for each regulated or economically critical function when tokenisation automates, compresses or redistributes traditional roles?
Authorities generally do not treat decentralisation, smart contracts or public networks as removing responsibility for regulated activity. The recurring policy question is how accountability is allocated across issuers, tokenisers, secondary intermediaries, custodians, administrators, transfer agents, settlement operators and technology providers. Tokenisation also creates role convergence, where one entity may issue, distribute, custody, operate a venue, maintain the register and control smart contract functionality.
Accountability is commonly mapped by function across the tokenisation lifecycle, including token creation, asset verification, custody, disclosures, trading access, lifecycle events and client protection. One observed model uses operational categories such as primary tokeniser, secondary offeror and custodian, while another frames the issue more generally as the need for an identifiable person to stand behind each regulated activity. The accountability question also extends to ecosystem enablers that may not fit traditional categories, including DLT infrastructure providers, smart contract developers, oracles, analytics providers, digital identity providers, bridge operators and key management providers. Governance issues are more acute for permissionless systems because protocol upgrades, forks, rule enforcement, validator behaviour and dispute resolution may lack the clear locus of responsibility found in permissioned or consortium systems.
How can tokenised systems scale without creating fragmented ledgers, closed ecosystems or inconsistent technical standards?
The core policy concern is fragmentation. If tokenised assets are issued and traded on separate networks that neither connect with one another nor with existing market infrastructure, each network becomes a closed system with its own pool of liquidity, and the efficiency gains tokenisation is meant to deliver are undermined. Authorities are therefore technology-neutral on which ledger is used but not indifferent to architecture. Two things are treated as conditions for scaling. The first is common standards, covering data structures, transaction formats, token identifiers, identity verification, messaging and settlement rules, so that different networks can work together. The second is connectivity between tokenised networks and the existing infrastructure of depositories, payment and RTGS systems, custodians, brokers and fund administrators, so that a tokenised and a conventional version of the same asset remain part of one market.
Who should be able to access tokenised financial services, and how should identity, eligibility and financial-crime controls operate across wallets, ledgers and intermediaries?
Access to tokenised services rests on identity. The frameworks that address the question treat verification of participants as the basis for access and carry over the familiar requirements of customer due diligence, anti-money-laundering and sanctions obligations and investor eligibility conditions, together with, in some approaches, the ability to link on-chain activity to an identifiable off-chain legal entity for supervisory purposes. The ledger’s record supports monitoring, but on-chain data can be pseudonymous, so identity frameworks are regarded as necessary to prevent illicit activity.
The measures discussed operate at three points. Before a transaction, participation is limited to customers who have passed know-your-customer checks, in some frameworks by permitting only wallets at verified addresses. At the point of transfer, tokens may be restricted to addresses that the issuer or fund manager has verified as belonging to eligible holders, a practice referred to as whitelisting, and token standards may be used to verify a holder’s identity, capacity and credentials. After a transfer, holdings that have nonetheless reached an ineligible holder are expected to be redeemed or cancelled, which presupposes that the issuer or manager retains the ability to correct the register. Programmable freezing and clawback functions serve this purpose, and remote attestation and zero-knowledge proofs are discussed as possible ways of achieving similar outcomes, although their limitations are not yet fully understood.
What form of money should settle tokenised transactions, and how should settlement preserve finality, par value and the singleness of money?
Tokenised settlement requires coordination between the asset leg and the money leg. Full DvP or PvP on-chain generally depends on a compatible settlement asset, whether central bank money, in the form of existing reserve balances or tokenised reserves, tokenised bank deposits or stablecoins. Central banks treat central bank money as the settlement anchor for wholesale markets, while tokenised deposits and stablecoins raise distinct questions about bank liability, reserve backing, redemption, par value, monetary fragmentation, financial integrity and cross-border use.
The central design question is which of these settles the payment leg. Central bank money is commonly described as anchoring finality, monetary stability and the singleness of money in wholesale markets, and RTGS synchronisation services and the Eurosystem’s Pontes platform connect tokenised asset ledgers with central bank money, with natively tokenised central bank reserves under exploration. Tokenised deposits are analysed as bank liabilities that preserve the two-tier monetary system where interbank settlement continues in central bank money, although deposit tokens transferable to third parties can trade away from par. Stablecoins are treated as private settlement assets whose design raises questions of redemption at par, reserve quality and liquidity, the issuer’s capacity to supply liquidity in stress, financial crime resilience on public networks and monetary sovereignty, and are regarded as complements to central bank money with reservations about their use for wholesale settlement at scale. Atomic settlement is also described as involving trade-offs, with reductions in settlement risk set against pre-funding requirements, loss of netting efficiencies and higher intraday liquidity needs.